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Political Attitudes and National Identities in Scotland and England 
 
Ross Bond 
 
‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a 
movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle’ (Gellner, 1983: 1) 
 
These are the opening sentences of Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism, one of 
the most famous books on the subject, by one of its leading scholars. Gellner’s words 
highlight the fact that any study of nationalism and national identities must consider 
their political significance, and it is the purpose of this chapter so to do. But in this 
chapter, and indeed this book, we are concerned with nationalist sentiment of a 
different kind, that which can more usefully be termed national identity. This relates 
to a more subjective sense of belonging or attachment to a particular nation, one 
which the individual assumes is shared with other co-nationals. The chapter will 
assess the degree to which such sentiments are indeed related to political attitudes.  
 
The chapter will highlight and develop three particular features of ‘political’ attitudes. 
Firstly, political attitudes may be represented by people’s beliefs about the most 
appropriate constitutional arrangements for the government of the nation within 
which they are resident: in stark terms, national independence, some form of devolved 
government at a national level, or centralized government at a state level. This has, 
self-evidently, been the essence of debates about UK devolution and its possible 
futures, and, as stated in the introduction, national identities have been an important 
element of these debates. One might assume that constitutional change in the UK was 
inspired to a considerable degree by national identities in the ‘non-English’ territories 
of the UK and that, in turn, the establishment and further development of the 
devolved political institutions might change conceptions of national identity in the 
UK, including in England. Are people’s national identities closely aligned with those 
political attitudes which have constitutional significance? That is the first question 
which this chapter seeks to answer. 
 
The second kind of political attitudes concern the degree to which people living in 
one of the national territories of the UK post-devolution feel solidarity with, or 
dissociation from, those living in the other national territories. States – even devolved 
states – need a certain amount of ‘glue’ to hold them together. The extent to which 
national identities are shared between the people of Scotland and England is 
examined elsewhere in this volume, and certainly shared identities are one important 
element of solidarity, but so too are certain political opinions. To an extent, these 
cannot be divorced from the constitutional attitudes outlined above. For example, the 
attitudes of people in England towards Scottish independence may provide an 
indication of weakening identification and/or increasing antagonism between these 
different parts of the UK. However, so too might opinions about the economic and 
fiscal benefits which each of these ‘partners’ in the Union derives from the 
continuation of this partnership. Such attitudes may not have a specifically 
constitutional character, but may nevertheless have important constitutional 
consequences if evident grievance weakens the glue which holds the state together. 
Also important in this sense, although less obviously political in character, is the 
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degree to which people identify on a personal level with those who live in a different 
nation within the UK. So the second central question to be addressed is the extent to 
which there is evidence of solidarity or dissociation. 
 
In turn, the third dimension also relates to some extent to the issue of identification 
and may also have constitutional import. These are what we might call ‘ideological-
legislative’ political attitudes. They are less concerned with constitutional issues and 
more with normative beliefs about social justice and morality and the ways in which 
governments might exercise power in accordance with these norms. Rather than 
examine a series of distinct social issues or policy preferences, it is more useful (and 
economical) to address ideological-legislative preferences in a broader sense. This 
will be done through utilising two well-established scales, one of which places 
individuals on a left-right political spectrum, and the second on a libertarian-
authoritarian dimension. If the political character and normative beliefs of people 
from different national units within the same state show profound differences, then 
once more this might raise questions about the future stability of that state. Thus the 
third and final question to be answered concerns whether there are any evident 
ideological divides between different parts of the UK.  
 
The broader question to be addressed, then, concerns what national identities and 
political attitudes, and the relationships between them, can tell us about the likelihood 
of further constitutional change in the post-devolution UK. While recognising that 
Wales and Northern Ireland are an important part of this post-devolution context, in 
common with the rest of the book the focus will be on England and Scotland. The 
evidence which will be drawn upon and evaluated is taken from questions in large-
scale social and political surveys. This represents a contrast and complement to much 
of the other evidence considered in this book. As Bechhofer and McCrone (2007: 
253) point out, surveys are a necessary tool when attempting to assess patterns of 
national identity across broad populations, but it is also important that we are alive to 
the limitations of this approach, and these will be discussed briefly below.  
 
Many of the survey questions we draw upon were inspired by constitutional change 
itself and by associated research programmes, not least the Leverhulme Trust 
programme upon which the book is founded.  However, the sheer diversity of 
questions which constitutional change has generated (and the resource limitations 
within which even the most generously-funded programmes must work) means that 
some relevant questions have been asked more frequently, and more recently, than 
others. The chapter uses the most up-to-date data available with respect to each 
question. All data are taken from the Scottish and British Social Attitudes Surveys. 
 
National identities and the Constitution 
This section investigates whether national identities in Scotland and England are 
related to three issues of constitutional significance: opinions about the best means of 
governing the respective countries (what might be called constitutional preferences); 
political party support; and trust in the institutions of government. As has been 
discussed elsewhere in the book there are a number of different ways of measuring 
national identity in survey questions. The method used in this chapter is the ‘multiple 
choice’ question which allows people to select as many national identities as they 
believe apply to them. This question has been consistently asked on an annual basis in 
the British and Scottish Social Attitudes surveys during the entire period since 
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devolution. Here we use it to identify three categories of respondent in both Scotland 
and England: those who identify as Scottish or English but not British; those who 
identify as Scottish or English and British; and those who identify as British but not 
Scottish or English1. So the question allows us to identify whether people adopt an 
exclusive ‘sub-state’ national identity (Scottish or English), an exclusive ‘state’ 
national identity (British), or whether they adopt both of these and thus have a dual 
national identity. Others have described this distinction as ‘state’/‘national’ 
(Bechhofer et al, 1999; McCrone et al, 1998) or ‘state’/‘ethnonational’ (Heath & 
Kellas, 1998; Kellas, 1998) or ‘supranational’/‘national’ (McCrone, 1997). However, 
describing both ‘sub-state’ and ‘state’ identities as national identities is helpful 
because it makes the important distinction between two different territorial levels 
while still recognising that, for many people in the UK, Britishness will be conceived 
of as a national identity in a similar fashion to the ‘sub-state’ identities of English, 
Scottish and Welsh (Bryant, 2006; Gallagher, 1995: 721; Langlands, 1999). 
 
It should, however, also be recognised that for a number of different reasons 
(historical, geographical, political, cultural, demographic) the state/sub-state 
distinction is likely to be more keenly appreciated in Scotland (and indeed in Wales 
and Northern Ireland) than in England, where many people tend to conflate English 
and British identities (Kumar, 2003; Langlands, 1999; Rose, 1982). Moreover, the 
potential limitations of assessing national identities in the UK through survey 
questions do not end there. As Wynn Jones (2001: 46) points out, even subtler survey 
measures of national identity do not allow for change in identification based on 
different social or political contexts. Nor do they uncover the various meanings 
national categories might hold (Brand et al, 1993; Heath and Kellas, 1998; 
Henderson, 1999), although some survey-based and experimental studies have sought 
to address this question (see Bechhofer & McCrone, 2007; Haesly, 2005). 
Nevertheless, surveys have established consistent patterns of difference in national 
identities between different parts of the UK as well as correlation with other key 
social and political variables (see, e.g., McCrone et al, 1998; McCrone, 2001) and 
with alternative measures of national identity and sentiment (see e.g. Heath et al, 
1999; Heath & Smith, 2005). The consistencies are such that one can be confident 
that, notwithstanding their limitations, these means of measurement are 
methodologically robust: they are assessing something ‘real’ about national identities 
in the UK. Moreover, there is evidence of convergence in findings between studies 
utilising primarily quantitative and qualitative methods (Bechhofer & McCrone, 
2007).  
 
The ways in which respondents to the latest available surveys (2006) in England and 
Scotland divide between the three categories of national identity previously outlined 
are shown in Table 1. These data reflect differences in patterns of national identities 
in the two countries discussed elsewhere in the book. Broadly, English and British 
identities have a much more equal salience in England than do Scottish and British 
identities in Scotland, where Scottish identity is clearly much more prominent, 
although dual identities also account for one-third of respondents2. 
                                                 
1 Note that the analysis concerns only those who identify as Scottish in Scotland or English in England, 
not those who identify as English in Scotland or Scottish in England. 
2 In fact this is an unusually low figure for dual identities in Scotland compared with other recent 
surveys. In the three Scottish Social Attitudes surveys from 2003-2005 the figure ranged from 39-47%. 
 4 
 
Table 1: Dual and Exclusive National Identities in England and Scotland, 2006 
 England Scotland 
 % % 
English/Scottish not British 22 51 
English/Scottish and British 45 33 
British not English/Scottish  23 10 
Neither English/Scottish nor British3 10 6 
base 3666 1594 
Sources: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 and Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2006. 
 
How then are these identities associated with key constitutional attitudes in both 
countries? In England, respondents are asked the question below about direct 
constitutional preferences. Table 2 shows how responses to this question vary by 
national identities.  
 
With all the changes going on in the way the different parts of Great Britain are run, 
which of the following do you think would be best for England... 
• ...for England to be governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK 
parliament, 
• for each region of England to have its own elected assembly that makes 
decisions about the region's economy, planning and housing, 
• or, for England as a whole to have its own new parliament with law-making 
powers? 
 
Table 2: National Identities and Constitutional Preferences in England, 20064 
 English not 
British 
English and 
British 
British not 
English 
All 
 % % % % 
Westminster status quo 50 57 58 55 
Regional Assemblies 15 18 18 18 
English Parliament 27 22 16 21 
base5 182 448 213 923 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2006. 
The table shows that, regardless of national identity, the Westminster status quo is 
clearly the most popular constitutional preference in England. Substantial minorities 
in each category do favour constitutional change but, especially in the dual identity 
and exclusively British groups, supporters of change are divided fairly evenly 
between the two options. This is somewhat less true of the exclusively English 
category, with support for an English Parliament highest in this category (but still 
                                                 
3 People in this category are not examined separately in subsequent tables but are included where data 
are given for all respondents and also in reported measures of association. 
4 All the associations between national identities and political attitudes shown in tables 2-7 are 
statistically significant at a level of p <0.01. The strength of any such associations is of course another 
matter, as will become clear. 
5 In some tables the overall sample size is smaller than the survey as a whole because only a sub-
sample of respondents was asked the question. Similarly, column percentages in some tables do not 
sum to 100 because those answering ‘none of these’, ‘don’t know’ etc. have been excluded. 
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little more than one-quarter). There is evidence, then, that English identity is 
associated with stronger support for an English parliament while British identity is 
more closely associated with the status quo, but the variation is fairly weak. 
Nevertheless, these data do suggest a possible shift because, if anything, previous 
surveys tended to show an even weaker association between national identities and 
constitutional preferences in England. 
 
In Scotland, the preferred constitutional options are of course different. Respondents 
are offered the options of Scottish independence, either within or outside the EU; the 
status quo of devolution, either with or without the current taxation powers; or a 
return to the pre-devolution position of no elected Scottish parliament and 
government from Westminster. Table 3 shows how responses vary by national 
identity. Responses favouring independence or devolution in either of the preferred 
forms have been amalgamated in the table. 
 
Table 3: National Identities and Constitutional Preference in Scotland, 2006 
 Scottish not 
British 
Scottish and 
British 
British not 
Scottish 
All 
 % % % % 
Scottish Independence 42 20 15 30 
Devolution status quo 45 65 60 54 
No Scottish Parliament 5 12 23 9 
base 798 523 178 1588 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 
 
The table shows an immediate contrast to the findings from England in that national 
identities and constitutional preferences are much more closely associated. This is 
reflected in the statistical measure of association for each table: 0.133 for England, 
0.197 for Scotland6. Those in the exclusively Scottish category are much more likely 
to support Scottish independence than are those with a dual or exclusively British 
identity and, in turn, those in the latter group are unlikely to support independence but 
more likely to favour a return to centralised Westminster government. It is the 
exclusively Scottish group which stands out as being most distinctive in their 
opinions, particularly with regard to support for independence. Indeed if we focus 
specifically on exclusive Scots and compare them with all other respondents treated 
as one category, then the contrast in measures of association between the Scottish and 
English data becomes much more obvious, with Cramer’s V rising to 0.293 for 
Scotland. However, this only tells half the story. In Scotland as in England the status 
quo is the most popular option in all three identity groups, albeit only marginally so in 
                                                 
6 The correlation coefficient used is Cramer’s V, which is commonly applied to cross-tabulations of 
this kind. The coefficient may run between 0 (no association whatsoever between the two variables in 
the cross-tabulation) and 1 (a perfect association). It should be noted, however, that for categorical data 
of this kind it is rare to achieve strong correlation coefficients. For example, for this to be achieved for 
Table 3 would require the vast majority of respondents in the Scottish not British category to support 
independence, and for similar majorities in the Scottish and British and British not Scottish groups to 
support devolution and no parliament respectively. It should also be noted that a somewhat stronger 
correlation coefficient (0.316) may be achieved with respect to the Scottish data if one applies a 
measure which is appropriate to ordinal data (‘gamma’). This may be done for the Scottish data 
because both variables have an evident rank order, from more to less Scottish and from high to low 
Scottish political autonomy. The constitutional options in England cannot be so ordered.  
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the exclusively Scottish category. It is particularly striking that half of those who 
profess no British identity believe that Scotland should continue to be governed 
within the United Kingdom, while three-quarters of those who profess no Scottish 
identity favour some form of Scottish government (in most cases devolution). So, in 
Scotland, what might be termed the ‘alignment’ of national identities and 
constitutional preferences is certainly stronger than it is in England, but as the 
correlation coefficients indicate, it is hardly strong, especially if we consider all 
categories of identity separately rather than comparing the exclusively Scottish with 
all others. 
 
This is even more evident in the views concerning which political institution people 
believe should have the most influence over the way their country is run. In Scotland 
in 2006, 67% of those with an exclusively Scottish identity believed that the Scottish 
Executive (prior to the 2007 name change to ‘Scottish Government’) should be most 
influential compared to only 8% who thought the UK government at Westminster 
should have most influence over the way Scotland is run. The differential narrows 
when we consider those in the dual identity and exclusively British categories – from 
around 8:1 to 4:1 and 3:1 respectively – but it is clear that there is a broad consensus 
on this question in Scotland which encompasses those of all national identities7. This 
question was not asked in England in 2006, and one has to go back to 2003 for 
comparative data. A very similar finding emerges: even though people with an 
exclusively English identity are more likely to believe that a new English parliament 
should be the most influential institution, even among this group this option is only 
favoured by around one in six respondents, and indeed comes below local councils 
which are chosen by around one in five. In contrast to Scotland, the UK government 
at Westminster is the most popular choice regardless of national identity, and its 
prevalence only varies marginally between those with an exclusively English national 
identity (47%) and those with an exclusively British identity (51%). 
 
A second way to assess the constitutional significance of national identities is to 
examine their association with support for particular political parties. Of course in 
England – in contrast to the other UK territories – there is no political competition 
between ‘nationalist’ parties which are the most obvious advocates of radical 
constitutional change and ‘unionist’ parties which seek to limit the extent of such 
change. The Conservatives have to some degree assumed the mantle of an ‘English’ 
party, both in terms of their core electoral support and their advocacy of ‘all-England’ 
solutions to the constitutional anomalies created by devolution. Under William Hague 
in the late 1990s the possibility that the Conservatives in government would establish 
an English Parliament was briefly on the agenda, but this lacked the support ever to 
become official party policy (Ward, 2004: 159). They currently favour more modest 
constitutional changes with respect to ‘English-only’ legislation which would not 
fundamentally alter the Westminster model in England. Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats have shown more appetite for further constitutional change along regional 
lines but it is doubtful whether their positions on the constitution would be reflected 
in disproportionate support among any particular national identity group. However, 
while overall one might not expect party support to vary greatly by national identity 
                                                 
7 In each case, most of the remaining respondents said that local councils should have most influence. 
Indeed in each identity category more people gave this response than chose the Westminster 
government. 
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in England, examining any such associations provides a useful benchmark for a 
similar exercise in Scotland, where the SNP in particular are much more obviously 
associated with radical constitutional change.  
 
Table 4 shows how supporters of the principal political parties in England break down 
across the categories of exclusive and dual national identities. The measure of party 
support used combines questions which ask respondents whether they support any 
particular party and then, for those who do not, asks whether they feel closer to any 
party. Of course, many people decline to nominate a party in response to either 
question, and they are represented by the ‘None’ category. Those who supported a 
party other than Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat (e.g. the Greens) are not 
represented as a separate category in the table, but they are included in the final 
column which shows data for all respondents. As expected, although Conservative 
supporters have a somewhat more English than British profile (as indeed do those 
who support no political party) and the opposite is true of Labour and Liberal 
democrat supporters, any differences are small: there is only a very weak association 
(0.093) between party support and national identities in England.  
 
Table 4: Party Support and National Identities in England, 2006 
 Labour Conservative Lib Dem None All 
 % % % % % 
English not British 20 25 16 27 22 
English and British 48 48 47 38 45 
British not English 23 22 26 22 23 
Base  1192 1030 447 536 3650 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2006. 
 
Table 5 shows the kind of associations between ‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ parties and 
identities which might be expected in Scotland. SNP supporters are the most likely to 
identify as exclusively Scottish, and Conservative supporters as exclusively British. 
Liberal Democrat supporters also have a relatively British profile. However, although 
the correlation coefficient for the table is 0.207 – notably stronger than for the English 
data in table 4 – once more this does not support the conclusion that national identities 
and party support in Scotland are strongly associated. This is most evident with 
respect to Labour supporters, more than half of whom are exclusively Scottish 
(indeed, given the relative size of the two parties’ support in the 2006 survey, Labour 
supporters contribute a larger proportion to the Scottish not British category than do 
SNP supporters). It is also true that although Conservative supporters are more likely 
to hold an exclusively British identity than those from other parties, a larger 
proportion have an exclusively Scottish identity than are exclusively British. Thus 
while both Conservative and Labour parties strongly emphasise their British 
credentials and would contemplate further constitutional change only within a broadly 
British framework, their perspectives on constitutional policy do not necessarily map 
on to the identities of their supporters. Moreover, it is also true that around one-third 
of SNP supporters professed some form of Britishness, and therefore the SNP’s status 
as an explicitly non-British party is again not always reflected in their supporters’ 
identities. 
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Table 5: Party Support and National Identities in Scotland, 2006 
 Lab Con Lib Dem SNP None All 
 % % % % % % 
Scottish not British 51 32 33 65 58 51 
Scottish and British 38 38 44 29 25 33 
British not Scottish 8 25 18 3 6 10 
base 529 206 142 270 214 1588 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2006. 
 
The final issue to be considered in this section is the relative trust which people have 
in institutions of government and how, if at all, this might vary by national identity. In 
Scotland in 2006 people were asked how much they trusted the Scottish Executive  
and the UK government to work in Scotland’s best interests. The different degrees of 
trust invested in both institutions, and across different categories of national identity, 
are shown in table 6. 
 
Table 6: Do people trust the Scottish Executive and UK government to work in 
Scotland’s interests? Scotland, 2006  
Trust Scottish Executive 
(UK government in 
brackets) … 
 
 Scottish 
not British 
Scottish 
and British 
British not 
Scottish 
All 
 % % % % 
… Just about always /  
Most of the time 46 (15) 55 (25) 62 (37) 51 (21) 
… Only some of the time / 
Almost never 51 (82) 43 (73) 38 (62) 46 (76) 
base 798 523 178 1588 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2006. 
 
The first thing to note from the table is that people overall, and in each identity 
category, have much more trust in the Scottish Executive than they do the UK 
government. Secondly, the degree of trust in each institution varies by national 
identity. With respect to the UK government, this association has a predictable 
character: the exclusively Scottish respondents are the least trusting, followed by 
those with a dual identity and then the exclusively British who are the most trusting. 
But even among the ‘British’ a clear majority of respondents (62%) would trust the 
UK government only some of the time or almost never. In terms of trust in the 
Scottish Executive the relationship with national identity is rather different to what 
might be expected. Those in the British not Scottish category show the highest degree 
of trust in the distinctively Scottish institution, and indeed are far more trusting of this 
body than they are of the UK government (62% to 37%). Of course there are many 
other factors which may influence trust in political institutions and it is not my 
purpose here to explore these. However, one obvious conclusion might be that the 
reason that the exclusively Scottish are less trusting of the Scottish Executive than 
those in other categories of identity relates to the party political character of the 
Executive at the time of the survey in 2006: a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. But 
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this does not provide an entirely satisfactory explanation, firstly because we have 
already observed that those with an exclusively Scottish identity are most strongly 
represented among Labour supporters, and secondly because a similar question in 
previous surveys which asked about trust in the Scottish Parliament as opposed to 
Executive produced broadly similar results. For example, in the 2003 Scottish Social 
Attitudes survey, the exclusively British showed a greater degree of trust in the 
Scottish Parliament than did the exclusively Scottish, albeit that the difference 
between them was less than in 2006. In 2003, levels of trust among the exclusively 
Scottish were rather higher than in 2006, with 59% saying they would trust the 
Parliament at least most of the time compared to 67% among the ‘British’ group. 
Despite some decline in trust among the exclusively Scottish in recent years, overall 
these data indicate that national identities in Scotland are not strongly associated with 
trust in the key political institutions of the post-devolution UK. This is reflected in the 
correlation coefficients of 0.158 (trust in Scottish Executive) and 0.265 (UK 
government)8. 
 
What of England? An obvious difference is that, aside from the London Assembly, 
there are no devolved institutions about which to gauge trust, so analysis is limited to 
trust in the UK government and how this relates to national identities. The most 
recently available data (Table 7) are also rather more dated than in Scotland, coming 
from 2003. Overall, trust in the UK government in England is much higher than in 
Scotland (this is also true if we compare with 2003 Scottish data, which are very 
similar to 2006) and only a little lower than trust in the Scottish Executive in Scotland 
(although lower still if we compare with 2003 Scottish data, which nonetheless relates 
to Parliament rather than Executive). The degree of association between trust and 
national identity is also less than in Scotland (correlation coefficient = 0.147), 
although as in Scotland it is those with an exclusively ‘sub-state’ (English) identity 
who are the least trusting of the UK government. Even if we were to accept, then, that 
lack of trust might suggest an appetite for some kind of constitutional change (and, as 
was noted above, political trust is likely to relate to many other factors) there is only 
weak evidence that it may be those with the strongest English identities who support 
constitutional change the most.  
                                                 
8 An ordinal measure of association has again been used since the response options for trust follow a 
rank order from more to less trusting. The coefficients are based on the full tables in which each option 
– just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, and almost never – is represented 
separately. 
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Table 7: How many trust the UK government to work in England’s interests? 
England, 2003 
 English 
not British 
English 
and British 
British not 
English 
All 
 % % % % 
Just about always /  
Most of the time 42 54 55 55 
Only some of the time / 
Almost never 54 42 41 44 
base 212 364 316 975 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2003. 
 
Many of the findings discussed in this first section substantiate previous survey 
research. Work carried out in Scotland in the pre-devolution period (Brand et al 1993, 
1994; Brown et al, 1998; McCrone, 2001) showed a clear association between 
national identities and constitutionally significant political views with, for example, 
those with an exclusively Scottish (rather than British) identity more likely to support 
the SNP and to favour Scottish independence9. However, such relationships were not 
straightforward. For example, many supporters of the SNP and of independence were 
not ‘exclusive Scots’, and even those with the most unionist political attitudes (i.e. 
supporters of the Conservatives and opponents of devolution) were more likely to 
prioritise a Scottish rather than British identity. Such findings revealed a non-
alignment between identities and political attitudes in Scotland (Bond, 2000). Similar 
post-devolution research continued to highlight this non-alignment (see e.g. Paterson 
et al, 2001; Bond and Rosie, 2002). With respect to England, Heath and Kellas’s 
(1998) analysis showed that those who adopted exclusive identities displayed a 
stronger appetite for constitutional change than those with dual identities, but research 
on national identities and constitutional attitudes in England in the post-devolution 
period has indicated that associations between them are rather weak (see e.g. Curtice 
and Heath, 2000; Curtice, 2006).  
 
Solidarity or Dissociation? 
The degree to which national identities and national differences might be politically 
significant relates not only to self-conceptions of identity and constitutionally-
significant political attitudes within given UK territories but also to how people view 
the political status of other parts of the UK. If there is an evident desire for the 
dissolution of the union, or substantial grievances about the relative benefits of 
continued union in a post-devolution context, then the continuance of the UK state 
might be called into question. This section considers the views of people in Scotland 
and England about the best means of governing the other country. Do people in 
Scotland believe that England should now be governed by its own parliament? Do 
people in England feel that it would be better if Scotland were fully independent? Are 
                                                 
9 Some of the previous studies discussed here use a five-category scale to measure national identity, in 
which respondents choose one option ranging from ‘Scottish not British’ to ‘British not Scottish’. This 
contrasts somewhat with the simpler three-category measure used in this chapter, which is constructed 
from responses to the multiple choice national identity question outlined above. However, patterns of 
association between identities and political attitudes are broadly similar regardless of which measure is 
used. 
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people in both countries broadly supportive of the current constitutional 
arrangements? Or are people in Scotland and/or England in fact largely indifferent to 
the constitutional fate of their neighbours? After considering these questions, the 
views of people in both countries concerning the economic and fiscal benefits (or 
disbenefits) which they believe their own nation derives from the union are examined. 
Finally, a rather more direct measure of solidarity which explores whether a shared 
sense of social class is more or less important than a shared nationality in each 
country is considered. Much of the data we examine in this section is taken from 
surveys carried out in 2003, around the end of the first Scottish parliament. While this 
certainly allows one to consider the potential impact of devolution upon feelings of 
solidarity between people in Scotland and England, it is also possible that further 
change in opinion may have taken place over the course of the second Scottish 
parliamentary period up until 2007, and beyond. 
 
Table 8 shows the constitutional preferences of people in Scotland for the government 
of England in 2003. The pattern of response to the same question among respondents 
in England in the same year is also shown in the table. This shows that in both 
countries, desire for constitutional change of any sort was outweighed by support for 
the status quo. The only notable differences are a somewhat higher level of support 
for regional assemblies in England and a higher proportion of ‘don’t knows’ in 
Scotland, but overall the pattern of response is very similar10. Examining these data 
according to respondents’ national identities does not reveal any striking differences. 
In Scotland, the status quo is the most popular option for each of the three categories 
of national identity, although comparatively speaking those with an exclusive Scottish 
identity are rather more likely to believe that England should have its own parliament 
while for the exclusively British the opposite is the case. In England there is a pattern 
that is very familiar from table 2: the status quo is supported by a majority in each 
identity category and those with an exclusively English identity are somewhat more 
likely to support an English parliament than those in the other identity categories.  
                                                 
10 This question was asked of some respondents in Scotland in 2006, but they were participating in the 
British Social Attitudes Survey, and because less than 100 people in Scotland were asked this particular 
question one must be cautious about the validity of the data. Nevertheless, even allowing for a large 
margin of error in such a small sample, they do suggest a substantial increase in support for an English 
Parliament –  39%, compared to 44% in favour of the Westminster status quo and 12% Regional 
Assemblies. It should however be noted that the data from England also show an increase (albeit more 
modest) in this support between 2003 and 2006 (compare tables 8 and 2). 
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Table 8: Constitutional Preferences for government of England. Responses in 
Scotland and England, 2003 
 Scotland England 
 % % 
Westminster status quo 53 55 
Regional Assemblies11 17 24 
English Parliament 18 16 
Don’t know 10 4 
base 1508 975 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 and British Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 
 
If the views of people in Scotland with respect to England’s constitutional status were 
broadly similar to those of people in England – at least in 2003 – is the same true of 
corresponding opinions regarding Scotland’s constitutional status? Table 9 indicates 
that this is indeed the case, with devolution supported by a majority in each country.  
 
Table 9: Constitutional Preferences for government of Scotland. Respondents in 
England and Scotland, 2003 
 England Scotland 
 % % 
Scottish Independence 17 26 
Devolution status quo 59 56 
No Scottish Parliament 13 13 
Don’t know 12 6 
base 1917 1508 
Sources: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 and Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 
 
The most notable difference is that support for independence is somewhat higher in 
Scotland, but this merely establishes that support for the union is, if anything, even 
stronger in England and so there is not much evidence of dissociation in the post-
devolution period. Similarly to the Scottish respondents in table 8, the proportion of 
‘don’t knows’ is also higher for people in England who are asked to state their 
constitutional preference for Scotland. Do national identities make a difference? With 
respect to Scotland, the answer is similar to our conclusions regarding table 3 above: 
yes, but only to a degree. Only 10% of those in the exclusively British category 
support Scottish independence, while 23% do not support any form of Scottish 
parliament. Equally, 39% of the exclusively Scottish support independence and only 
4% believe there should be no Scottish Parliament. But the status quo of devolution is 
the most popular option in each category including the exclusively Scottish, where it 
is favoured by 50% of respondents. As one might expect, differences related to 
national identities in England are even smaller. The exclusively English are somewhat 
more likely to believe that Scotland should be independent (22%) but there is majority 
support for devolution in each category of identity. Overall, then, at least with respect 
                                                 
11 The version of the question asked in Scotland in 2003 was somewhat different to the 2006 version 
outlined above. In this version, the regional assemblies would ‘… run services like health’. Around 
one-third of the sample in England in 2003 was also asked this version, and to ensure direct 
comparison only these respondents are represented in table 6 (although in fact response to the version 
related to ‘economy, planning and housing’ was very similar). 
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to 2003 data, it is not the case that people in England think that it would be better if 
Scotland went its own way, and nor is it true that they believe that constitutional 
change has already gone too far and that there should be a return to centralised 
Westminster government. It is also interesting to note that in 2003 people in England 
were also asked how they would feel if Scotland and Wales were to become 
independent: would they be pleased, sorry, or neither? Only a small minority (less 
than 10%) said they would be pleased while nearly half said they would be sorry, 
once more certainly not offering positive evidence of a lack of solidarity. However, a 
large minority (42%) said they would be neither pleased nor sorry, perhaps suggesting 
a large measure of indifference in England with respect to the constitutional future of 
other parts of Britain. 
 
If political disaffection cannot be found in people’s direct opinions on the 
constitution, perhaps they might be more obvious in their beliefs about economic and 
fiscal justice? Once more in 2003, respondents were asked which economy, England’s 
or Scotland’s, benefited more from having Scotland as part of the UK, or if the 
benefits were about equal. The patterns of response in Scotland and England are 
compared in table 10.   
 
Table 10: Does England’s or Scotland’s economy benefit more from having 
Scotland in the UK? Respondents in Scotland and England, 2003 
 Scotland England 
 % % 
England benefits more 30 7 
Scotland benefits more 24 39 
Equal 40 40 
Don’t know 6 12 
base 1508 1917 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 and British Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 
 
An identical proportion (4 out of 10) in both countries believe that the benefits are 
equally shared and this is also the most common response on both sides of the border. 
However, in England a similarly large minority believe that Scotland benefits more 
from its place in the UK, far outnumbering the small minority who believe England 
benefits disproportionately. In Scotland nearly one-quarter think that their own 
country benefits more from the union, not far short of the 30% who feel this about 
England. Overall then, there is some evidence here of grievance and this is more 
marked among respondents in England. Here national identities (not shown in the 
table) make an evident difference, once again more marked in Scotland. 42% of those 
with an exclusively Scottish identity believe that England benefits more as against 
10% of those with an exclusively British identity. Correspondingly, 41% of the 
exclusively British believe that Scotland benefits more compared to only 16% of the 
exclusively Scottish. It should be noted, however, that in each identity category a 
large minority believe that the benefits are equal. In England, it is those with an 
exclusively English identity who are the most likely to believe that Scotland benefits 
most from the union: 45% compared to 35% of the exclusively British, but once more 
the differences are much smaller than in Scotland. Overall, then, perceptions of 
economic injustice are clearly related both to national location and national identity, 
particularly in Scotland. 
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How about the analogous issue of differences in attitudes to government spending 
under the union? In 2003 respondents were asked whether, compared to other parts of 
the UK, Scotland received a fair share of government spending or whether it received 
more or less than this fair share. Again the different patterns of response in England 
and Scotland are shown in table 11. Once more, response varies by country, although 
this time the sense of grievance at fiscal injustice is much stronger in Scotland. Less 
than a quarter of people in England felt that Scotland received more than its fair share 
of public spending but nearly half of people in Scotland believed that the country 
received less than its fair share. However, large minorities in both countries do think 
that Scotland gets pretty much its fair share and no fewer than one in four people in 
England did not feel equipped to give a definite response to the question, which once 
more may reflect indifference or ignorance. In England, those with an exclusively 
English identity are somewhat more likely to believe that Scotland gets more than its 
fair share of government spending but differences are not great and the most popular 
response in each identity category is that Scotland receives its fair share. In Scotland, 
however, differences across identities are much more evident. While 63% of 
exclusive Scots believe that Scotland gets less than its public spending entitlement, 
only 28% of the exclusively British think likewise. In this group, and indeed in the 
dual identity category, the most common response is that Scotland receives its fair 
share. 
 
Table 11: Does Scotland receive a fair share of UK government spending, or 
more or less than this fair share? Respondents in Scotland and England, 2003 
 Scotland England 
 % % 
More than fair share 11 22 
Fair share 35 45 
Less than fair share 47 8 
Don’t know 8 25 
base 1508 1917 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 and British Social Attitudes Survey, 2003 
 
There is, then, some evidence of grievance on both sides of the border but, especially 
from the English perspective, this is not represented by profound dissatisfaction with 
the economic and fiscal arrangements in the post-devolution UK. In Scotland too 
there is a fairly widespread recognition that Scotland is not fundamentally 
disadvantaged by maintaining its place in the UK. However, the questions thus far 
relate solidarity or dissociation to political arrangements at a ‘macro’ level, and it is 
interesting to draw on data showing how people on both sides of the border might 
relate to each other at a personal level. On this occasion, the same question was asked 
in 2006 in both Scotland and England. The question asks respondents to say whether 
they feel they have more in common with people with the same (Scottish or English) 
nationality to them who come from a different social class, or with people from the 
same social class but different nationality12. Moreover, as well as comparing patterns 
                                                 
12 The measure of class used for this question is subjective rather than objective. That is, the question 
is phrased in accordance with which social class respondents chose to identify with in a previous 
question, rather than their occupational status. Thus, for example, someone in England who had 
previously identified as working class would be asked whether they felt they had more in common with 
 15 
of response between the two nations, because this question has some historical 
pedigree in Scotland we can also assess whether solidarity based on shared social 
class seems to be declining with respect to national differences or not. The data for 
2006 are shown in table 12. 
 
Table 12: More in common with same class, different nationality or same 
nationality, different class? Scotland and England 2006 
 Scotland England 
 % % 
Same class, different nationality  25 26 
Same nationality, different class 47 34 
No preference 19 25 
Depends on the individual 5 6 
Don’t know / not answered 5 10 
base 1494 2775 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 and British Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 
 
The table shows that levels of class solidarity are very similar in both nations, with 
around a quarter of respondents saying they would have more in common with people 
from the same social class but the opposite nationality. National solidarity is stronger 
in each country, but particularly so in Scotland, where nearly half of respondents feel 
they would have more in common with people of the same nationality but a different 
social class. This is true of about one-third of respondents in England. A quarter in 
England and a fifth in Scotland do not give a decisive answer either way. One might 
expect that individuals’ national identities would make a difference to the response 
they give to this question, and this is certainly true in Scotland. Among those with an 
exclusively Scottish identity, the differential between the two main categories of 
response is wider, with only 20% saying they would have more in common with 
English people of the same class compared to 53% who would have more in common 
with Scottish people of the opposite class. For those with an exclusively British 
identity, on the other hand, the differential is reversed, with a higher proportion (38%) 
saying they would have more in common with English people of the same class than 
Scottish people of the opposite class (27%). The figures for those with a dual identity 
are broadly similar to those for respondents as a whole. Differences by national 
identity in England are much less obvious. There is little variation in the proportions 
saying they would have more in common with Scottish people of the same class, but 
those with an exclusive English identity or a dual identity are significantly more likely 
to say they would have more in common with English people of the opposite class 
compared to those with an exclusively British identity, who are rather more likely not 
to choose either way. Overall though, once more we find that national identities in 
Scotland make more of a difference in terms of key social and political attitudes than 
is true in England. 
 
This leaves the question of whether the period of devolution has coincided with an 
increase in national solidarity at the expense of class solidarity in Scotland. In fact 
there is very little evidence for this. An identical question asked in 1997 produced 
very similar results, with 23% of respondents saying they would have more in 
                                                                                                                                           
middle-class English people or working-class Scottish people. Those who did not identify with any 
social class are excluded. 
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common with English people of the same class compared to 46% with Scottish people 
of the opposite class. 
 
Ideological-Legislative attitudes 
Finally, are there any evident ideological divides between the people of Scotland and 
England which might imply that further constitutional separation is desirable or 
necessary? Are any such divisions based on people’s subjective sense of national 
identity? Two well-established political scales, each derived from a series of survey 
questions, can be used to address this question. The first measures the degree to which 
respondents are left- or right-wing in their political outlook. It is based on the 
following five statements: 
 
Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off 
Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers 
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth 
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor  
Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance 
 
For each statement, respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreement (agree 
strongly; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; disagree strongly) with each 
response given a value from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly). These 
responses are then summed and divided by 5 to give an average point on the scale. 
The left-right scale can therefore run from a minimum of 1 (for someone who agrees 
strongly with all statements) to a maximum of 5 (for someone who disagrees strongly 
with them all). Table 13 shows the mean value on the left-right scale for all 
respondents in Scotland and England in 2006, and also how this value varies for each 
of the three categories of national identity13. 
 
Table 13: Mean values on left-right scale, Scotland and England 2006 
 Scotland England 
All respondents 2.61 2.64 
Scottish/English not British 2.50 2.56 
Scottish/English and British 2.70 2.70 
British not Scottish/English  2.75 2.65 
base 1408 3152 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 and British Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 
 
The table shows that, overall, there is very little difference in the degree to which 
people living in Scotland and England might be considered left- or right-wing on this 
measure. There is a prominent perspective in Scotland which emphasises the nation’s 
‘social democratic’ credentials. Data such as those in Table 13 do not necessarily 
contradict such beliefs – there remain good reasons to think that Scotland is a social 
democratic country (see McCrone and Keating, 2007) – but they do indicate that there 
is no strong evidence that people in Scotland are much more social democratic in their 
perspectives than are their southern neighbours in England. In fact there is more 
                                                 
13 People who did not respond to one or more of the questions are excluded. This also applies to table 
14 below. 
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variation between categories of national identity within each nation than there is 
between the nations. Once more, however, such variation is very limited in England 
and indeed there is no clear pattern of association, with the dual identity group, rather 
than those in either of the exclusive categories, showing the most right-wing profile14. 
In Scotland the key group would appear to be those who have an exclusively Scottish 
identity, who are noticeably more left-wing than their counterparts with a dual or 
exclusively British identity. Indeed the difference in mean values between these two 
latter groups is not statistically significant, and even the degree of difference between 
the exclusive Scots and the others hardly amounts to a fundamental division on the 
basis of national identity. Both aspects of these findings largely reflect previous 
survey research concerning such political values. Where differences between Scotland 
and England do emerge, either with respect to specific attitudes or the type of multi-
question scale utilised above, these frequently disappear when attitudes in England 
are disaggregated on a regional basis (Brown et al, 1998; Hearn, 2000; Rosie and 
Bond, 2007). Social democracy is related more to the leftward slant of the party 
political structure in Scotland (Paterson, 2002; Rosie and Bond, ibid.) than it is to the 
attitudes of the people. It is also argued that social democratic values are related to 
national identity in Scotland (Hearn, 2000: 3) and the analysis bears this out to some 
degree at least, and in doing so once more mirrors earlier analysis (Rosie and Bond, 
ibid.). 
 
The second summary scale with which to assess ideological divides between and 
within Scotland and England measures the extent to which people hold a 
predominantly libertarian or authoritarian position on social issues. It is based on the 
following six statements: 
 
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values 
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences 
For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence 
Schools should teach children to obey authority 
The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong 
Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards 
 
The same response options and method for calculating the final scale value for each 
respondent are used as with the left-right scale outlined above. In this scale the value 
1 represents the most libertarian position and 5 the most authoritarian. Table 14 shows 
the mean value on the libertarian-authoritarian scale for all respondents in Scotland 
and England in 2006, and also how this value varies for each of the three categories of 
national identity. The table shows that people in both countries are more socially 
conservative (as measured by the libertarian-authoritarian scale) than they are 
politically conservative (as measured by the left-right scale): the values in all 
categories are markedly higher than in table 13. But the difference between the two 
nations is once more very small15. This finding is virtually identical to previous 
                                                 
14 In fact the difference in mean values on the scale between the two exclusive identity categories is 
not statistically significant.  
15 To put the difference of 0.04 between the countries into perspective, we might take the example of 
educational qualifications where, in both Scotland and England, the mean score of those with a degree 
is about 0.7 lower than those with no qualifications. 
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analyses based on 2003 and 2004 data (Rosie and Bond, 2007). Those with an 
exclusive Scottish or English identity in the respective nations are somewhat more 
authoritarian than are their counterparts with dual or exclusively British identities, but 
again the differences are relatively small16. Overall then, there is little evidence to 
suggest that people in Scotland and England diverge fundamentally in terms of 
ideological-legislative political attitudes, nor that national identities in either nation 
are strongly associated with such attitudes.  
 
Table 14: Mean values on libertarian-authoritarian scale, Scotland and England 
2006 
 Scotland England 
All respondents 3.69 3.73 
Scottish/English not British 3.76 3.84 
Scottish/English and British 3.65 3.71 
British not Scottish/English  3.62 3.71 
base 1420 3195 
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 and British Social Attitudes Survey, 2006 
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter began by setting out three specific questions and one broader question. 
These questions have been addressed using data from Scotland and England in the 
post-devolution period. The first question asked whether people’s national identities 
were closely aligned with constitutionally-significant political attitudes. In England, 
there was little evidence of any such alignment. It is true that there is some consistent 
evidence that those who identify as English rather than British are rather more likely 
to favour constitutional change, most specifically the establishment of an English 
Parliament, but in fact their constitutional views are not much different from their 
counterparts who have a dual English/British or exclusively British identity. Support 
for the continuation of Westminster government, more or less in its current form, is 
strong across all three groups. The findings in relation to Scotland are similar in that 
the status quo (of a devolved Scottish Parliament) is also strongly supported among 
the exclusively Scottish or British and those with a dual identity. Associations 
between identities and attitudes (including party support and trust in governments at 
state and sub-state level) are much more evident than in England, and for the most 
part they have a predictable character. People who feel Scottish rather than British are 
more likely to support independence and/or the SNP and have low levels of trust in 
UK government. But evidence of non-alignment is also extensive, not least with 
respect to the large proportions of people with an exclusively British identity who 
show high levels of support for Scottish institutions and those respondents who do not 
profess any British identity but who nevertheless do not favour constitutional changes 
or parties which would divide Scotland from Britain politically.  
 
The second question concerned the extent to which there was evidence of solidarity or 
dissociation between people living in Scotland and England. This was examined with 
                                                 
16 Similarly to the analysis for the left-right scale, the difference in means between the ‘Scottish and 
British’ and ‘British not Scottish’ categories is not statistically significant. The same is true in England, 
where the difference in means between the dual and exclusively British identity categories is not 
statistically significant either. 
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respect to constitutional, economic, fiscal and inter-personal attitudes. The 
significance of national identities was also considered in each case. To the extent that 
dissociation might be represented by a desire among people in England for Scotland 
to be independent or for people in Scotland to believe that England should have its 
own parliament, there is little evidence of this. A majority of respondents in both 
countries favour retaining the current constitutional status of their neighbour. There is 
some evidence of widespread perceptions that the economic benefits of the union are 
not shared equally between Scotland and England, but it is also true that only a 
minority in each nation believes that the other nation’s economy benefits more. A 
similar pattern is observable with respect to the degree to which public spending is 
distributed equally, although in this instance, and in contrast to views about economic 
benefit, it is people in Scotland who have the greater sense of injustice. There is some 
evidence that solidarity with one’s sub-state counterparts represents a challenge to the 
continued coherence of the state to the degree that sub-state nationality appears to be 
a more powerful focus of association than does social class. But again this applies 
only to a minority of people in both Scotland and England, and large minorities are 
unwilling to profess that sub-state nationality ‘trumps’ state-wide social class as a 
general rule or vice versa. It is also true that, in Scotland at least, there is no evidence 
that solidarity based on one’s nation is increasing at the expense of class-based 
association. People’s national identities do make a difference to the patterns of 
response to all these questions and, although often these differences are not large and 
do not represent fundamental cleavages in opinion, it is consistently true that those 
with exclusive sub-state identities in both Scotland and England are the most likely to 
be discontented with the current constitutional settlement and the least likely to feel 
solidarity with those in the neighbouring nation. 
 
The third question asked whether there were any evident ideological divides between 
people in Scotland and England. This was addressed by using two scales designed to 
place people on a left-right and a libertarian-authoritarian dimension. There was no 
evidence of any substantial ideological differences between the two nations. Indeed 
there was greater variation between those with different national identities within each 
nation. Once more, although those with an exclusive sub-state identity are distinct to 
some degree, they are not fundamentally different from their counterparts with dual or 
exclusive state identities. 
 
The broader question concerned what national identities and political attitudes in the 
post-devolution UK might tell us about the likelihood of further constitutional change. 
Overall, there are some consistent associations between identities and attitudes, 
although these are not uniformly evident. Particularly in Scotland, but also to some 
degree in England, it is those with exclusive sub-state identities whose attitudes are 
most consistent with a desire for change. However, and perhaps most importantly, 
such differences in attitudes are not so fundamental as to suggest that even profound 
shifts in conceptions of national identity in Scotland and England would necessarily 
lead to very strong demands for constitutional change. The pattern of response to 
some of the questions in England also suggests that there is a substantial degree of 
indifference with respect to Scotland’s status and whether this might occasion the 
need for constitutional change in England. Of course if national identities changed so 
radically that only small minorities continued to hold a state level identity then this 
might in itself have profound constitutional implications, but that is both a doubtful 
proposition and an issue which this chapter does not address directly. Finally, it is 
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also true that not only national identities but political attitudes too may shift. 
Although much of the data discussed in this chapter is consistent with previous 
research from recent years, this does not preclude future change. After all, relatively 
speaking, post-devolution United Kingdom is still quite a young country.  
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